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COMMENTS
A PIGMENT OF THE IMAGINATION: LOOKING AT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION THROUGH JUSTICE
SCALIA'S COLOR-BLIND RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
One Saturday, old friends, Judge Learned Hand and Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, shared a ride in a coupe. At their destination, Holmes
stepped down and walked away. Hand decided to goad his older friend.
Hand called out, "Well, sir, good-bye. Do justice!" Holmes stopped,
turned, and summoned Hand nearer. Hand drew close. "That is not my
job," Holmes admonished. "My job is to play the game according to the
rules."' In the area of benign racial classifications (affirmative action),
the Supreme Court has, for a good number of years, been more con-
cerned with achieving some amorphous concept of justice than playing
by the constitutional and statutory rules.2
As both a law professor and a Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia
consistently criticized the Supreme Court's approach to benign racial
classifications. Similarly, Scalia has forthrightly appealed for a race neu-
tral standard for benign racial classifications. He stated that "there is
only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to 'undo the
effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to eliminate their
own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification."3
Part II of this Comment discusses the background to the constitution-
ality of benign racial classifications, which can conveniently be divided
into three historical time periods. Part III juxtaposes upon that back-
ground Antonin Scalia's own thinking on the question of affirmative ac-
tion, including his color-blind rule. Part IV argues that a rule of color-
1. HARRY C. SHRIVER, WHAT GusTo: STORIES AND ANECDOTES ABOUT JUSTICE OLI-
VER WENDELL HOLMES 10 (1970).
2. The focus of this Comment, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, reads in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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blindness for benign racial classification schemes is practical, anchored in
sound legal principles, and morally and philosophically correct.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION
The history of affirmative action law and the concept of color-blind-
ness, at least for these purposes, can conveniently be divided into three
time periods: 1896 to 1978, the pre-Bakke period; 1978, the year Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke4 was decided; and 1978 to the
present, the post-Bakke period.
A. 1896 to 1978: From Plessy to DeFunis
"The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the com-
mon government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to
be planted under the sanction of law."5
-Justice John Marshall Harlan
The .Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
when states classify people and treat them differently on the basis of that
classification. The meaning given the clause, and the standard of review
courts have found within it, determine what state classifications and dif-
ferences are constitutionally permissible. Traditionally, ordinary eco-
nomic regulation that classifies people and things into groups has been
evaluated under a highly deferential standard of review: "minimum ra-
tionality." Minimum rationality means a statute will not be stricken if it
is conceivable that there is some rational relation between the means
selected by the legislature and a legitimate public objective.6
At one time, classifications based on race or national origin also re-
ceived this level of deference from the Supreme Court. The deference
was most apparent in Plessy v. Ferguson.7 At issue in Plessy was the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that segregated railroad cars.8
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. This standard has been expressed many times, in many similar ways. See, e.g., Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a New York City ban of
advertising on vehicles). Today, this test is often expressed by quoting McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (holding, inter alia, that a state Sunday closing law did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause). "The constitutional safeguard [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective." Id. This expression of the minimum rationality standard is preferred by
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Id. at 540.
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The law was challenged on several grounds, one of which was that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause.9 Seven members of the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana statute, justifying their deci-
sion, in part, on a distinction between social and political equality.10
Blacks, the Court said, were guaranteed only political equality by the
Fourteenth Amendment. "[The amendment] could not have been in-
tended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races
upon terms unsatisfactory to either.""
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, gave a simple reason for striking the
statute: "Our Constitution is color-blind... "I'2 Based on this principle,
Harlan regretted "the [Court's] conclusion that it is competent for a
State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely
upon the basis of race.' 13
Harlan was a distant and largely unheeded voice by the time the
Court again approached the issue of equal protection and non-economic
classifications in two important and historic cases. In Korematsu v.
United States 4 and Hirabayashi v. United States,'" the Court faced gov-
ernmental acts as invidiously and perniciously based on national origin
as the regulation in Plessy was based on race. The impetus for both
cases came from early American involvement in World War 11.16 The
United States government, fearful of an imminent Japanese attack on
West Coast bases, imposed unprecedented restrictions on American citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry.
In Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court,
upheld a military curfew for Japanese-Americans living on the West
Coast. 7 Nonetheless, Stone wrote, "Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."' 8
9. d at 543.
10. Id. at 544. Justice Brewer did not participate in the case. Justice Harlan was the lone
dissenter.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. Id (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
15. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
16. The United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was bombed on December 7,
1941. President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942. The ac-
tions taken pursuant to this Executive Order form the basis for both cases.
17. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105.
18. Id at 100.
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Likewise, in Korematsu, the Court let stand a military order exclud-
ing all persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas of the West
Coast. 9 In the Court's opinion, Justice Black set the standard upon
which the next half century of racial classification law would rest. Legal
restrictions, Black wrote, that affect the civil rights of a single race or
national origin are "immediately suspect. '2 ° Although not immediately
unconstitutional, such restrictions are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such re-
strictions; racial antagonism never can."',
Although it was not immediately apparent, Korematsu gave birth to a
standard beyond the "minimum rationality" or "reasonableness" of the
Plessy era-strict scrutiny. The standard worked as follows: classifica-
tions that discriminated against racial minorities or people of a certain
national origin were inherently "suspect" and therefore subject to "strict
scrutiny. ' 22 To pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classification would have to show a "compelling" interest ad-
vanced by "narrowly tailored" means.'
The death knell for the prescriptive segregation at issue in Plessy and
Korematsu sounded in Brown v. Board of Education.24 In this famous
case, the Court held segregation in public schools to be violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.25 Brown was
later used as a basis for striking down numerous state-sponsored classifi-
cation schemes that segregated blacks and whites to the disadvantage of
blacks.26
19. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
20. Id.
21. Id. Justice Black is often cited as a champion of civil rights. Yet, he never renounced
what may be his most savagely criticized and most anti-civil rights opinion. JAMES J. MAGEE,
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT 71 (1979).
22. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.10(a)(1), at
655 (4th ed. 1991).
23. Id. This test is almost impossible to meet, Korematsu being an exception.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Realizing and enforcing "the promise of Brown" was a more
difficult process for both the Court and an emerging civil rights movement buoyed by Brown.
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding a deseg-
regation plan that involved busing within a metropolitan school district).
25. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courthouses); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), affd per curiam,
358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S.
879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd per
curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), afffd
per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses). The rationale for striking down segregated public
schools-that segregation had an adverse psychological effect upon black school children-
[Vol. 77:327
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A few decades later, the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams, that is classifications that advantage people on the basis of race or
national origin, came before the Court. Affirmative action programs
posed a constitutional dilemma distinct from Brown and its offspring.
Segregated school systems clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Enforcing Brown deprived no one "of the right to an equal education or
any other legal right."'2 7 On the other hand, affirmative action programs
deny a legal right to some members of a racial majority.'8 As a result,
the judicial standard of review used for such affirmative action programs
became the issue.
The Supreme Court approached the issue tentatively. In DeFunis v.
Odegaard,z9 the Court looked at the benign use of race in a minority
admissions program for the University of Washington Law School.
Although a "promising vehicle"3 for resolution of the issue, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments and then vacated and remanded
the case as moot because DeFunis would graduate regardless of the
Court's decision.3 Justice Douglas did not think the case was moot and
reached the merits.3" Douglas picked up the fallen standard of color-
blindness that Harlan had once carried and berated affirmative actions
programs in general and Washington Law School's program in particu-
lar. "There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred....
There is no superior person by constitutional standards.... Whatever his
race, [DeFunis] had a constitutional right to have his application consid-
ered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner.'33
B. 1978: Bakke
"The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same pro-
was supported by a number of studies. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. Since this rationale
hardly seemed applicable to segregated public beaches, buses, golf courses, courthouses, and
parks, the Brown opinion has been as roundly criticized as Plessy. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORI,
THE TEMPTrNG OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 75-76 (1990). Only the
righteous core of the Brown decision saves it from total disgrace.
27. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION 155 (1990).
28. Id.
29. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
30. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1046 (1978).
31. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319.
32. Id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 336-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1994]
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tection, then it is not equal. ' 34
-Justice Lewis F. Powell
The Court in DeFunis predicted that another similar case involving
affirmative action would present itself "with relative speed. '35 It did not
have to wait long. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,36
the plan in question was the Medical School of the University of Califor-
nia at Davis's reservation of sixteen seats in each entering class of one
hundred for disadvantaged or minority students.37 In a precursor of fu-
ture affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court fractured severely.
From the numerous opinions, the "holding" of Bakke may be summa-
rized as follows: Five Justices found the Davis scheme violated Title
VI,3 8 while a different combination of five Justices held that race could
be considered in the Davis admissions process. 3 9
Although he wrote for only himself, Justice Powell's opinion would
eventually become the law.4" Powell first concluded that the U.C. Davis
scheme was "suspect," despite its advantaging of minority groups, be-
cause the Constitution and its guarantees run to the individual not
groups. Powell stated: "[I]t is the individual who is entitled to judicial
protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic back-
ground because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather
than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group
7)41
As a suspect classification, Powell analyzed the U.C. Davis plan
under strict scrutiny and found it violated the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The medical school had advanced four goals as "compelling" interests,4
3
34. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, J.).
35. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319 (per curiam).
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. Id. at 275.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist all found
the Davis plan violated Title VI. Id. at 421. Title VI generally prohibits racial discrimination
in any program receiving federal financial assistance.
39. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell agreed on this. As a model
for race-conscious admission plans, Powell recommended the "Harvard College Admissions
Program." See id. at 321 (appendix to opinion).
40. Id. at 269-324. There is a degree of irony in the fact that although Powell believed
strict scrutiny should be the standard of review for benign racial classifications (as he stated in
Bakke), only Powell's departure and the subsequent appointment of Anthony Kennedy in
1988 would solidify the five votes necessary to make this standard the law of the land. See
generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J.).
42. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.).
43. The interests purportedly served were:
[Vol. 77:327
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only one of which Powell found permissible-a diverse student body.44
This interest was compelling because such a student body contributed to
the robust exchange of ideas, enriched the medical training of students,
and equipped students with understanding.45
Next, Powell found the means selected by Davis to promote this in-
terest wholly inadequate. The U.C. Davis plan was not sufficiently tai-
lored to meet the diversity interest because a "special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity. 46
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun coauthored a sin-
gle opinion. This group of four found no Title VI violations.47 The
group also found no violation of the Constitution.48 They added that the
Constitution did not have to be color-blind.49 Instead of using strict
scrutiny, they applied a different constitutional standard of review, "in-
termediate scrutiny."50 In other words, a benign racial classification
scheme must serve "important" governmental objectives and must be
"substantially related" to the achievement of the objectives. 51 The group
decided that "Davis'[s] articulated purpose of remedying the effects of
past societal discrimination is... sufficiently important to justify the use
of race-conscious admissions programs."52 The second prong of interme-
diate scrutiny was also met because the plan did not stigmatize or single
out either the minorities chosen or the whites rejected. 3
(i) 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools
and in the medical profession,'... (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination;
(iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically
diverse student body.
Id. at 306 (Powell, J.).
44. Id at 312 (Powell, J.).
45. Id at 312-14 (Powell, J.).
46. Id at 315 (Powell, J.).
47. Id at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
48. Id at 325-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
49. Id at 356, 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
50. Id at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.). The intermediate standard of
review originated in gender discrimination cases. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
The four Justices justified the use of this standard because neither a presumption of constitu-
tionality (minimum rationality) nor strict scrutiny applied to the benign use of race. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 360-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
51. This is a popular way to state this test, which has been fully articulated in other cases.
See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
53. Id at 374 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.).
1994]
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Justice Stevens wrote the third major opinion. 4 Stevens disposed of
the case by ruling that the U.C. Davis admissions program violated Title
VI.55 Stevens never reached the constitutional question of whether the
Davis Plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Beyond getting Allan Bakke admitted to medical school, Bakke re-
solved little. The divided Bakke court simply mapped out the territory
upon which future Supreme Courts would do battle. Many questions
remained unanswered, the most important of which was whether the
standard of review for benign racial classifications would be strict scru-
tiny or the lesser standard, intermediate scrutiny.
C. 1978 to 1993: Weber to Croson and Beyond
"This dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review may
strike some as a lawyers' quibble over words, but it is not."57
-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
Post-Bakke race-conscious affirmative action cases involve (1) at-
tempted remedies for employment discrimination and (2) the preferen-
tial treatment of racial minorities in the award of public licenses or
funds. 8 To oversimplify somewhat, affirmative action plans in recent
cases were generally challenged on two grounds: under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act59 or under the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tee of equal protection, or both. 0
54. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J.). Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stew-
art and Rehnquist.
55. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J.).
56. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J.).
57. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTs IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451 (5th ed.
1992).
59. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); see also id. § 2000e-2(b)-(j).
60. Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, federal benign racial clas-
sifications are challenged under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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1. Employment Discrimination
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,6 the Court held that
"private, voluntary" 62 affirmative action programs did not violate Title
VII. An employer and a union had collectively bargained for a plan
"that reserve[d] for black employees 50 [percent] of the openings in an
in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black
craftworkers in the plant was commensurate with the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force."'63 Justice Brennan's majority opinion re-
jected the plaintiff's argument that Title VII should be read literally "to
prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans."'  The statute's lan-
guage "must therefore be read against the background of the legislative
history of Title VII and the historical context."'65
In the years after Weber, the Supreme Court addressed what would
be a recurring issue: an employer's race-conscious layoff plan.66 In Wy-
61. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber has become quite unpopular with the Rehnquist Court.
Two members of the Court have, on the record, declared that it should be overruled. See
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 669-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.).
62. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. Plaintiff did not challenge the plan on the basis of the Four-
teenth Amendment because there was no state action. Id. at 200.
63. Id. at 197.
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id& The history and legislative intent of Title VII, Brennan argued, show that Con-
gress wanted to open employment opportunities for blacks. See, e.g., id. at 202-07.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote a long and fervent dissent, accus-
ing the majority of evading "clear statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and
uniform precedent" in order to reach its conclusion. Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This conclusion was clearly opposite of what Congress said that "no racial discrimination in
employment is permissible under Title VII." Id- at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This thought would be repeated a number of times by opponents of affirmative action
plans. See Scalia's dissent in Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657, where the court upheld an affirmative
action plan that attempted to increase the hiring and promotion of women.
66. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); see also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (a layoff plan for public school teachers).
In Stotts, the city of Memphis entered into a consent decree with a number of black
firefighters. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 565. Because the Court's decision was devoid of any constitu-
tional guidelines for affirmative action programs, it merits only brief mention here.
The decree's purpose was to increase the hiring and promotion of minorities. Id. While it
agreed to the consent decree, the city never admitted to, nor were there findings to the effect
that the city had discriminated in the past in its hiring and promotion practices. Id. at 565, 583
n.16. A year or so after the decree, budgetary problems struck. When the city considered
laying off some firefighters, the federal district court intervened. Id. at 566. After issuing a
preliminary injunction, the district court approved a modified layoff plan for the city. Id. at
567. When executed, the effect of the modified plan was that in "certain instances... nonmi-
nority employees with more seniority than minority employees were laid off or demoted in
rank." Id.
The Supreme Court overturned the lower court's order because it was not "a justifiable
1994]
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gant v. Jackson Board of Education,67 a school board and a teachers'
union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement
stated that when layoffs were required, teachers with the most seniority
would be retained "'except that at no time [would] there be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.' "68 Two years
later layoffs were required. Adhering to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the school board laid off some white teachers who had more sen-
iority than black teachers who were retained.69 The white teachers sued.
The Court addressed whether a school board could, within the con-
fines of equal protection, "extend preferential protection against layoffs
to some of its employees because of their race or national origin. '70 A
majority of the Supreme Court said no.7'
Justice Powell's plurality opinion decided that the collective bargain-
ing agreement was a "suspect" race-based classification favoring minori-
ties and disfavoring whites.72 As he had for the racially disadvantaging
scheme in Bakke, Powell applied the strict scrutiny standard.73 Powell
found the collective bargaining agreement unconstitutional because the
ends forwarded by the school board were not compelling and the means
were not narrowly tailored.74
The school board set forth two goals of the agreement: providing
minority role models and remedying past discrimination. Powell found
neither compelling. The role model goal lacked a "logical stopping
point."75 The interest in remedying past discrimination, Powell stated,
was compelling only in the face of proof of past discrimination.76 The
effort to enforce the terms of the [consent] decree [or] . . .a legitimate modification of the
decree .. " Id. at 583.
67. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
68. Id. at 270 (Powell, J.) (quoting Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement).
69. Id. at 272 (Powell, J.).
70. Id. at 269-70 (Powell, J.).
71. Justice Powell wrote the opinion, which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined. Justices O'Connor and White concurred with Powell's opinion for their own separate
reasons. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented, as did Justice
Stevens.
72. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (Powell, J.).
73. Id. at 273-74 (Powell, J.).
74. Id. at 283-84 (Powell, J.). Justice O'Connor found the plan's means adequate, but
indicated that the board had "failed to isolate a sufficiently important governmental purpose."
Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice White could not find any of the
board's asserted interests compelling. Id, at 295 (White, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 275-76 (Powell, J.).
76. Id. at 277 (Powell, J.).
[Vol. 77:327
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board provided no such proof.7 7 Powell then found the board's means
"too intrusive" and "not sufficiently narrowly tailored."7 " In general,
race-conscious layoff plans, Powell wrote, "impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular [nonminority] individuals, often
resulting in serious disruption of their lives."79
Later, the Court took an approach very different from that in Wy-
gant. It held that neither the Constitution nor Title VII prevented the
implementation of race-conscious programs that benefit individuals who
are not identified victims of prior discrimination.80
In Sheet Metal Workers' International v. EEOC,8 ' a plurality of the
Court held that a series of court orders did not violate the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause or statutory
law.82 After a series of cases and resultant court orders, a federal district
court imposed a 29.23% minority membership goal on the union.83 The
union appealed the order through the lower courts. 4
Justice Brennan quickly disposed of the constitutional question.
While recognizing the Court's failure to agree upon a standard of consti-
tutional review, Brennan held that the plan in question passed even the
77. Id at 278. Possibly seeing the error of their ways, the board was eager for the
Supreme Court to grant another opportunity to prove prior discrimination.
78. Id. at 283 (Powell, J.).
79. Id. In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, eschewed
applying any constitutional standard of review. Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He con-
cluded that the school board's plan "should not be upset by this Court on constitutional
grounds." Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented on different grounds.
See id. at 313-20.
80. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). Both cases were decided on July 2,
1986. Sheet Metal Workers dealt briefly with a constitutional challenge to a remedial court
order. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479-81 (Brennan, J.). Cleveland involved a Title
VII challenge.
81. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
82. Id. at 444-81 (Brennan, J.). Portions of Brennan's opinion were joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
83. Id. at 437. The union was found to have discriminated in the past against blacks and
Hispanics. Id. at 428. Justice Powell emphasized the extraordinary nature of this case, "It
would be difficult to find defendants more determined to discriminate against minorities." Id.
at 485 (Powell, J., concurring).
84. In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the Title VII question. Title VII did
not limit affirmative action programs to those that benefitted victims of past discrimination.
Id. at 453 (Brennan, J.). These programs "may be appropriate where an employer or a labor
union has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate
the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Id. at 445 (Brennan, J.). As he had in
Weber, Justice Brennan located Congress's intent in Title VII-not in the statute's plain lan-
guage-but in the statute's legislative history and its historical context. Id. at 453-70 (Bren-
nan, J.).
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strictest scrutiny."5 The interest of remedying prior discrimination was
compelling,86 and the court's orders were "properly tailored."87
Justice Powell concurred and wrote separately on the constitutional
matter. He applied the strict scrutiny standard and found that the plan
passed it.88 Neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Rehnquist reached the
constitutional question. O'Connor upheld the plan under Title VII89-
Rehnquist would have struck it under the same law.90
The final employment discrimination case explicitly involving race9'
was United States v. Paradise.' After a lengthy battle in lower courts,
this issue was presented to the Supreme Court: Whether it was permissi-
ble for a court to order relief "in the form of a one-black-for-one-white
promotion requirement to be applied as an interim measure to state
trooper promotions in the Alabama Department of Public Safety .... .93
The Supreme Court answered yes and upheld the lower court's order.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion again noted the Court's failure to set-
tle on the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny for race-conscious
affirmative action cases. However, the relief here satisfied even strict
scrutiny.94 The interest "in remedying past and present discrimination
by a state actor" was found to be compelling.9 5 And the one-for-one
85. Id. at 480 (Brennan, J.).
86. Id. (Brennan, J.).
87. Id. at 481 (Brennan, J.).
88. Id. at 485 (Powell, J., concurring). Eliminating the union's discriminatory practices
was a compelling interest. The means used here were akin to a hiring goal that was found to
be permissible in Wygant.
89. Id. at 489 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the same day, the Court decided Local 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 510 (1988), in which a group of
black and Hispanic firefighters entered into a consent decree with the city to increase the
promotion of minority firefighters. A union representing a majority of the city's firefighters
objected to the decree.
The Supreme Court held six to three that nothing in Title VII prohibited the remedy of a
consent decree. Id. at 515. Justice Rehnquist and Justice White wrote separate dissents. Id. at
530-45. The Court distinguished this case from Sheet Metal Workers: "[WIhether or not...
[Title VII] precludes a court from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial,
that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree." Id. at 515 (emphasis
added).
91. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the challenged plan sought
to aid the promotion of minorities and women. However, the only issue for the Court was
"whether in making the promotion [of a woman over a man] the Agency impermissibly took
into account the sex of the applicants in violation of Title VII." Id. at 619. The Court's ap-
proach to benign gender classifications is beyond the scope of this Comment.
92. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
93. Id. at 153 (Brennan, J.).
94. Id. at 167 (Brennan, J.).
95. Id. (Brennan, J.).
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promotion was "an effective, temporary, and flexible" means. 96
In dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, insisted strict scrutiny must be the standard.97 While she
agreed with Justice Brennan that the ends were compelling,98 she main-
tained that the remedy was not "narrowly tailored." 99
2. Preferential Contracting and Licensing Programs
The next three cases involving federal and local preference programs
for racial minorities in the distribution of public funds and licenses suc-
cinctly demonstrate how badly the Court was once split and how far it
has come in forming a majority on the issue of affirmative action.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,1 ° at issue was a requirement in a congres-
sional spending program that, absent an administrative waiver, man-
dated that ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works
projects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services
from minority business enterprises (MBEs).1°1 A business was an MBE
if minority group members had a controlling interest in the business.1 °
The statute further provided that a minority group member was a citizen
of the United States who was Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut.103 Nonminority contractors challenged this "minority
set-aside" program on equal protection grounds. Although there was no
majority opinion, the Supreme Court held the MBE provision did not
violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment."°
Chief Justice Burger's opinion-announcing the judgment of the
Court-was joined only by Justices White and Powell. Burger clearly
96. Id at 185 (Brennan, J.). In a separate opinion, Justice Powell analogized this case to
Sheet Metal Workers' and upheld the plan as constitutional. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring).
97. Id at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "[T]he District Court imposed a racial quota
without first considering the effectiveness of alternatives that would have a lesser effect on the
rights of nonminority troopers." Id. at 201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
101. Id. at 452-53 (Burger, C.J.).
102. Id. at 454 (Burger, C.J.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976)). "Controlling inter-
est" means, in this context, "a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority
group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of
which is owned by minority group members." 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988).
103. Id. (Burger, CJ.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976)). An interesting aspect of
these preferential licensing cases is the governmental entity's attempts to define who is a "mi-
nority group member."
104. Id. at 492 (Burger, CJ.).
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adopted neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny as a standard of re-
view.10 5 "However, our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision
would survive judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several
Bakke opinions.' 10 6 Considering this ambivalence over the proper con-
stitutional standard, Burger was unusually harsh in rejecting a color-
blind rule.'07
Justice Powell concurred and wrote separately to emphasize the need
for a standard of constitutional review. °8 Powell applied strict scrutiny
and found the MBE provision met the test.'0 9 Like Burger, Powell also
rejected the contention that the Constitution is a color-blind
document." 0
Justice Stewart wrote a blistering dissent."' Joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, Stewart resurrected the theme of a color-blind Constitution.
"Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a person differ-
ently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and
presumptively invalid.""' 2 He added that "the government may never
act to the detriment of a person solely because of that person's race." 113
Stewart concluded, "From the perspective of a person detrimentally af-
fected by a racially discriminatory law, the arbitrariness and unfairness is
entirely the same, whatever his skin color and whatever the law's pur-
pose, be it purportedly 'for the promotion of the public good' or
105. Id. (Burger, C.J.).
106. Id. (Burger, C.J.).
107. Id. at 482 (Burger, C.J.).
108. Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell also articulated five factors that should be
considered when determining whether the means of a certain program were "narrowly tai-
lored": (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the planned duration of the remedy; (3) the
relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or work force; (4) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; (5) the effect of the remedy on innocent
third parties.
Id. at 510-14.
Justice Brennan used a similar series of factors to analyze the means in United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-83, and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 584-600
(1990).
110. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. Marshall applied intermediate
scrutiny and found the MBE provision "plainly constitutional." Id. at 519 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
Considering Bakke and Fullilove together, at this point in time, six Justices opposed the
concept of a color-blind constitution.
111. Id. at 522-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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otherwise." 1 4
A strikingly similar, although technically distinguishable" 5 MBE
provision instituted by a local government came before the Court nine
years later. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.," 6 Richmond's plan
required nonminority-owned prime contractors to subcontract at least
thirty percent of the dollar amount of their city-awarded contract to one
or more MBEs.117 Like the plan in Fullilove, a business was considered
an MBE if minority group members had a controlling interest in the
business." 8 The city's plan also provided that a minority group member
was a citizen of the United States who was black, Spanish-speaking,
Asian, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut." 9
The most significant development of Croson was that a majority of
the Court 20 finally agreed that strict scrutiny should be the constitu-
tional standard of review for benign racial classifications.' 21 Richmond's
plan failed strict scrutiny because the city had failed to define both the
114. Id. at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
115. In Fullilove, there was a 10% set-aside. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989), set-aside was 30%. In Fullilove, the affected minority population represented
15-18% of the total population, while in Croson, it represented 50% of Richmond's popula-
tion. Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of
Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 1729, 1745 n.71 (1989).
116. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
117. Id. at 477. "There was no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the
city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated
against minority-owned subcontractors." Id. at 480.
118. Id. at 478; see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. Her opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in judgment and in the
application of strict scrutiny. Although Justice Stevens concurred in judgment, he avoided
joining the portion of O'Connor's opinion that set forth strict scrutiny as the standard of
review.
Some critics of the current Court's attitude have tried to deconstruct the Croson decision
in hopes of making it less significant. Michel Rosenfeld, for instance, wrote:
First, although six of the Justices found the Plan to be unconstitutional, only five agreed
that the strict scrutiny test provided the correct judicial standard. Of those five, more-
over, only four-a mere plurality-agreed on what would satisfy strict scrutiny in the
context of race-based affirmative action . . . even if not undertaken by the actual
wrongdoer(s). The fifth Justice in this group, Justice Scalia, had a more narrow concep-
tion of strict scrutiny and argued that it would only be satisfied when compensation is
undertaken by actual wrongdoers.
Rosenfeld, supra note 115, at 1748.
121. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). At least one commentator has argued that the decision to adopt strict scrutiny
means that the Supreme Court has also adopted a color-blind approach. Fred N. Knopf, As-
sessing Affirmative Action: City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. Strictly Scrutinizes Minority
Business Set-Aside Plans, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 237, 237 (1990).
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scope of the injury and the necessary scope of the remedial action.122
Justice O'Connor began and effectively ended her analysis with the
plan's purportedly compelling end to remedy past discrimination. The
Court held if a governmental entity attempted to defend the use of a
benign racial classification, the entity must be able to show prior discrim-
ination by the entity itself or by the specific, private sector industry in
that entity's jurisdiction." 3 O'Connor found no evidence to support a
conclusion that there was any past discrimination in the Richmond con-
struction industry.124 Similarly, she declared, "There is absolutely no evi-
dence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction
industry."' 25
Justice Kennedy concurred. 126 He also joined Justice Scalia's concur-
rence and praised the color-blind rule set forth therein. 27 Justice
Scalia's concurrence is the focus of this Comment and will be discussed
at length in Part III.
Shortly after Croson, a federal race-conscious licensing scheme came
before the Court. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 28 the FCC had
instituted two policies aimed at increasing minority ownership of broad-
cast licenses. One policy took race into account as a factor in compara-
tive proceedings for new licenses; the other policy permitted a "limited
category of existing radio and television broadcast stations to be trans-
ferred only to minority-controlled firms.' 29 The FCC defined a "minor-
ity" to include "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo,
Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." 3 '
Justice Brennan wrote for a five member majority. Brennan insisted
that because the measures in this case were mandated by Congress (not
by a local government, as in Croson), the constitutional standard of re-
view was intermediate scrutiny.13  Brennan then found two important
122. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11 (O'Connor, J.).
123. Id. at 498; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 14.10(a)(1), at 655-56.
124. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
125. Id. at 506. Having found the ends inadequate, O'Connor had only two comments on
the means used by the city. Id. at 507. First, Richmond had not considered the use of alterna-
tive, race-neutral means. Id. "Second, the 30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored
to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing." Id.
126. Id. at 518-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
129. Id. at 552.
130. Id. at 553 n.1 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 564-65.
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governmental goals: remedying past discrimination in the broadcast in-
dustry and encouraging programming diversity. 32 For the means prong,
Brennan deferred to congressional fact-finding that there was a suffi-
cient "nexus between minority ownership and programming
diversity."'133
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, dissented. O'Connor found the majority's distinc-
tion between this case and Croson on federalism grounds unsupported
by precedent or constitutional language. 34 O'Connor stated, "The Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the Federal Government
as it does the States, and no lower level of scrutiny applies to the Federal
Government's use of race classifications.' 35 O'Connor wrote that strict
scrutiny must control, and the policies here failed that standard.'36
The cohesiveness of the four Metro dissenters, Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy, who believe strict scrutiny should be the standard
of review, has become especially important in the wake of Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and White's retirements. 37 Although Justice White was
often unpredictable on the issue of affirmative action, 38 Brennan and
Marshall clearly favored the lesser constitutional standard of review, in-
termediate scrutiny. With Justices Souter and Thomas replacing the two
liberal Justices, there is reason to believe that Croson (and Wygant in the
employment discrimination area), rather than Metro, is more suggestive
of a "permanent" resolve by the Court that strict scrutiny should be the
constitutional standard of review for benign racial classifications. 39
III. JUSTICE SCALIA'S THOUGHTS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Before the Ascension
The only son of a Sicilian immigrant, Antonin Scalia graduated from
Harvard Law School.'4 0 In the 1970s, while a professor at the University
132. Id. at 567-69.
133. 1d at 569.
134. Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, also
dissented. See id. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 611-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Justice Brennan retired on July 20, 1990. For the possible effect on Metro, see No-
WAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 14.10(b)(3). Justice Marshall retired on July 20, 1991.
Justice White announced his retirement on March 19, 1993.
138. See Kenneth Jost, The Courtship of Byron White, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 66-67.
139. The word "permanent," considering an issue of this controversial degree and the
mortality of the Justices, is used as a relative-not an unequivocal-term.
140. 13 Roy M. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
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of Chicago Law School, Scalia wrote an illuminating piece on affirmative
action. 14 1
In this piece, Scalia was sharply critical of the Supreme Court's ef-
forts in affirmative action law, primarily the Bakke decision. He labeled
this area of the law "utterly confused" and full "of pretense or self-delu-
sion.' 42 He called Powell's assumption in Bakke, that a diverse student
body was a compelling interest, "an historic trivialization of the
Constitution.' '1 43
He then explored some flaws in the justifications of affirmative ac-
tion programs. Scalia noted affirmative action plans sought to disadvan-
tage a "white majority" without examining the many ethnic strands of
this majority. For example, Scalia pointed out that thousands of people
from southern and eastern Europe came to the United States in the last
great waves of immigration and suffered discrimination at the hands of
the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority. 44 More recently, some or all of
these groups benefitted from or practiced discrimination themselves.
However, comparing their racial "debt" with others who worked the
slave trade and maintained a racial caste system for years afterward,
Scalia wrote, "confuse[s] a mountain with a molehill.""'4 He concluded
that for reasons of "principle and practicality," he was flatly opposed to
benign racial classifications. 46
In 1982, President Reagan appointed Scalia to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. On June 17, 1986, Chief
Justice Warren Burger formally retired. President Reagan nominated
Associate Justice Rehnquist as the new Chief Justice and Scalia was
nominated to fill Rehnquist's seat.
Scalia's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee was ami-
cable.' 47 Scalia appeared for one day and fielded a variety of questions.
On the issue of affirmative action and especially the Court's decision in
Wygant, Scalia proved elusive and unwilling to commit to a point of
UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINA-
TIONS: 1916-1986, at vii (1989). The biographical information restated here is culled from the
somewhat more detailed treatment of Antonin Scalia's life in this volume.
141. Antonin Scalia, Commentary: The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147. The
piece is illuminating not so much for what it says, but rather how true Scalia would remain to
the ideas he set forth there.
142. Id. at 147-48.
143. Id. at 148.
144. Scalia listed Italians, Jews, Irish, and Poles among these groups. Id. at 152.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 156.
147. MERSKY & JACOBSTEIN, supra note 139, at viii.
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view.148
About his article in the Washington University Law Quarterly,149
Scalia was more forthcoming. He declared that the opinions set forth
there were "policy views of mine at the time. I think they are views held
by other reasonable people."' 50 When pressed, Scalia said the comment
did not address the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. 151
He continued, "when I had policy views I didn't think it [affirmative ac-
tion] was a good idea. That has nothing to do with whether I would
enforce it vigorously if it's passed by Congress. ' 152
After a second day of hearings, a unanimous Judiciary Committee
reported favorably regarding Scalia's nomination to the full Senate.
Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted ninety-eight to zero to confirm
Scalia's nomination. 53
B. On the Supreme Court
Of the four affirmative action cases to come before the Court since
his appointment, Justice Scalia voted to strike the plan in question every
time, although he only expressed his reasoning twice. 54
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 55 Scalia demonstrated that his
views on affirmative action had not changed from those expressed in the
law review article.'56 He dissented in Johnson because the majority had
turned Title VII into "a powerful engine of racism and sexism, not
merely permitting intentional race- and sex-based discrimination, but
often making it, through operation of the legal system, practically com-
148. Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings] (question of Sen. Charles Ma-
thias, Jr.).
149. See Scalia, supra note 141.
150. Hearings, supra note 148, at 76 (in response to a question by Sen. Howell Heflin).
151. Id. at 94 (in response to a question by Sen. Paul Simon).
152. Id. at 95 (in response to a question by Sen. Paul Simon). In light of his vote in Metro,
cynics may ask if Scalia qualified this statement enough not to have committed perjury. Jus-
tice Scalia voted against the affirmative action policies promulgated by Congress. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
153. MERSKY & JACOBSTEIN, supra note 140, at 1. Republican Senators Barry Goldwater
and Jake Garn did not vote.
154. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia has joined dissents in the two other cases. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 196-201 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Metro, 497 U.S. at 602-31 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting); id. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
156. Id. at 657-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting); RONALD J. Fiscus, THE CONsTITUTONAL LOGIC
OF AFFIRMATrrVE ACTION 12 (1992).
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pelled."'15 7 The result of the majority's interpretation of Title VII-
whites and males being unfairly disadvantaged-Scalia could not find
constitutionally permissible.'58
Scalia's second expression on the issue of benign racial classifications
was his concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'59 Although
he agreed with O'Connor that strict scrutiny should be the constitutional
standard of review,160 Scalia concurred in the judgment because he dis-
agreed with O'Connor's reasoning.' 6'
First, he differentiated between benign racial classifications enacted
by state entities and those enacted by the federal government. Scalia
stated that "[a] sound distinction between federal and state (or local)
action based on race rests not only upon... [the plain language of the
first and fifth sections of the Fourteenth Amendment] but upon social
reality and governmental theory."'162 One such reality was "that racial
discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the
state and local than at the federal level.' '1 63
Upon this base of federalism, Scalia constructed a color-blind rule for
benign racial classifications. "[T]here is only one circumstance in which
the States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination':
where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system
of unlawful racial classification.' 1 64 This rule may not be entirely color-
blind, but the rule views every racial classification as invidious, and thus
constitutionally invalid, under all but the most exigent and obvious
circumstances. 65
157. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
160. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 151 (1992). At least one com-
mentator attributed Scalia's concurrence to O'Connor's failure to follow her premise (all ra-
cial classifications are suspect and thus merit strict scrutiny) to its logical conclusion (all racial
classifications are unconstitutional). Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two
Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 108 n.9 (1990).
162. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Croson does
much to explain, at least from one point of view, what Scalia meant. Scalia's opinion "would
make it crystal clear to the political branches, at least those of the States, that legislation must
be based on criteria other than race." Id. at 518-19. However, because Scalia's rule was such
a radical departure from precedent, Kennedy did not believe it needed immediate adoption.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. An exigent circumstance would encompass threats to life and limb, e.g., a prison race
riot. Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia explained the obvious circumstance. "If, for example, a state agency has a
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States, Scalia continued, may act to remedy past discrimination in
several nonracial, and thus permissible, ways. Instead of preferential
contract and licensing programs for racial minorities, a state may adopt a
preference for small or new businesses. 166 Scalia also suggested "giving
the identified victim of state discrimination that which [the state] wrong-
fully denied him."' 67 Either way, the result would be the same: "While
most of the beneficiaries might be black, neither the beneficiaries nor
those disadvantaged by the preference would be identified on the basis
of their race.' 168
At the end of his concurrence, Scalia attacked two common argu-
ments advanced by affirmative action proponents. First, with a rhetori-
cal flurry, Scalia dismissed the notion that affirmative action programs
do not stigmatize or victimize nonminority group members. 69 Second,
Scalia rejected the theory of compensatory justice. Roughly stated, this
theory (also called restorative justice) declares that since minorities (spe-
cifically blacks) have been discriminated against in the past, affirmative
action programs are necessary and acceptable in order to "compensate"
those minorities.171 Scalia replied that this belief reinforces "a manner
of thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and that will, if it
endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still.' 17'
An inconsistency, in light of Scalia's later vote in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC,72 now becomes fully apparent and is best dealt with here.
The Croson rule was founded upon principles of federalism and explic-
itly mentioned only state action as presumptively unconstitutional. 73
For these reasons, it may be inferred that Scalia would be highly defer-
ential to federal affirmative action programs. 7 4 However, Scalia voted
discriminatory pay scale compensating black employees in all positions at 20% less than their
nonblack counterparts, it may assuredly promulgate an order raising the salaries of 'all black
employees' to eliminate the differential." Id. at 524; see also LIVELY, supra note 161, at 151;
Donald E. Lively, Constitutional Turf Wars: Competing for the Consent of the Governed, 42
HASTINS LJ. 1527, 1539 n.94 (1991).
166. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("for example, giving to a previously rejected black appli-
cant the job that, by reason of discrimination, had been awarded to a white applicant, even if it
means terminating the latter's employment").
168. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). "When we depart from this American principle [of
race neutrality] we play with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson, or
Croson bums."
170. Fiscus, supra note 156, at 8.
171. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
173. Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. This inference must be made with caution. Scalia did not believe Fullilove controlled
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against the federal policies at issue in Metro. How does one reconcile
the seeming inconsistency between this interpretation of the Croson rule
with Scalia's vote in Metro?
Some commentators do not agree that Scalia has been "inconsistent."
Rather, they charge Scalia with a sinister consistency. Scalia, they con-
tend, voted against both state and federal affirmative action programs
because such programs favor minorities and unfavorably disadvantage
white males.175
Beyond this possible explanation, there are two others. First, in
Metro, the federal government argued that its main policy interest was
not solely undoing the effects of past discrimination, but also the promo-
tion of broadcast diversity.'76 Scalia may consider the promotion of
broadcast diversity an illegitimate interest. 177 Therefore, the FCC plan
failed the strict scrutiny test.
The second possibility, of course, is that Scalia changed his mind and
decided to abandon altogether any distinction between the appropriate
level of review accorded federal and state governmental benign racial
classifications. There is ample evidence to support this as the more
likely explanation. First, Scalia, it will be remembered, joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro that stated there should only be one level of
scrutiny for either local or federal affirmative action plans. 78 Second, in
his law review article, Scalia stated his opposition to all affirmative ac-
tion programs without distinguishing between state and congressional
action .' 9 Finally, there are the sources from which Scalia derived his
race neutral idea. To take the most prominent example, Scalia quoted
the outcome of Croson, and he was reluctant to revisit the Fullilove holding. Id. at 522 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
175. See, e.g., Fiscus, supra note 156, at 40; see also Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black
Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understanding, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 83 (arguing that for
Scalia "race is the determining factor" in deciding cases); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 83 (1992) (arguing that Scalia is result-
orientated and his supposed dedication to "textualism, originalism, and historical positivism is
contingent and secondary"). Contra George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin
Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1309 (1990) (conceding Scalia's conservative position on affirmative
action but arguing "that a facile focus on any supposed 'result-orientation' in explaining his
approach to constitutional adjudication does not do [him] justice").
176. Metro, 497 U.S. at 566.
177. Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's dissent, which specifically attacked the FCC's goal of
broadcast diversity. Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Scalia, supra note 141, at 156.
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Professor Alexander Bickel in his Croson concurrence,"' and Bickel
made no distinction between the federal and state government. Bickel
focused not on the level of government doing the discriminating, but
rather the individual (regardless of color) upon whom that discrimina-
tion was visited. 81
IV. THE ImPERATIVE OF A COLOR-BLIND RULE
Having surveyed the background of affirmative action and in particu-
lar, Justice Scalia's view on the matter, a closer look at a race neutral (a
color-blind) rule for racial classifications, especially benign ones, is ap-
propriate. The meaning of a race neutral or color-blind rule was best
expressed by Professor Laurence Tribe.'82 Tribe's definition must be
read with caution. It provides a sound foundation for inquiry, but it is
not a perfect definition of race neutralism nor does it encompass all the
variations of race neutralism. Tribe defined race neutralists as "those
who deem race-specific preferences for minorities [affirmative action
plans] to be presumptively invalid, subject only to a narrow exception for
judicial relief to identified victims of proven race discrimination.' ' 8 3
This Part will first examine the legal foundation for a color-blind rule
and then briefly look at the practicality of a race neutral approach. It
concludes with a summary of the strong moral and philosophical argu-
ments against benign racial classifications and for a color-blind rule.
A. The Legal Foundation of a Color-Blind Rule
The legal foundation for a rule of race neutrality rests on a number of
cases in which the Supreme Court implicitly or explicitly endorsed such a
rule. The first step, however, should be to examine the text of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause simply says, no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
180. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
181. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 133. Bickel is so often cited by affirmative action oppo-
nents that this small part of his book has become a quasi-catechism.
182. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law
Be Color-Blind?," 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201 (1986). Tribe is a strong opponent of a color-
blind rule.
183. Id. at 201-02; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). Whereas Tribe's definition al-
lowed for an exception to the color-blind rule, others have argued that "strict adherence to the
color-blind principle is incompatible with the Supreme Court's endorsement of color-con-
scious remedies in a long line of school desegregation cases." Rosenfeld, supra note 115, at
1755-56.
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the laws."' 84 Of course, the larger question is what does this simple
clause mean? A number of preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First,
the appropriate focus should be on the word "person," because the guar-
antee of equal protection of the law is an individual right.185 However,
the guarantee does not run to individuals based on their membership in a
group, whether it is a majority or minority group.' 6 Besides, if the guar-
antee ran to groups, identifying persons in the majority racial group is
not as easy as it seems. Upon inspection, the white majority turns out to
be an amalgamation of ethnic minorities. 87
The most famous expression of the race neutral principle from the
Supreme Court was Justice Harlan's statement in Plessy: "Our constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens."' 88 Opponents of a color-blind rule stress the "manifest racism' 89
surrounding Harlan's dissent.' 90 However one assesses the strength of
Harlan's dissent nearly a century after it was written, the judgment im-
plicit within it still rings true. In the area of race relations, the massive
power of the state must be used for the unequivocal good of society.
One commentator stated that the tools of government are "capable of
much harm," and when those powers cannot confidently be used for
good, they should be "adjured altogether."'191
The initial formulation of strict scrutiny by Justice Black in Kore-
matsu provides, if not a foundation, at least a standard against which
race neutralism may be measured. Black stated that "all legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect. . . . [The] courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."'" A race neutral approach, with its narrow exemption for vic-
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.").
186. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.).
187. Lino A. Graglia, Racially Discriminatory Admission to Public Institutions of Higher
Education, 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 583, 585 (1977); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J.).
188. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
189. Tribe, supra note 182, at 203. "[The] color-blind ideal, it turns out, was only short-
hand for the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents our law from enshrining and
perpetuating white supremacy.. . ." Id.; see also Culp, supra note 175, at 90.
190. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTrrUTION 224 (1992).
192. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Tribe has argued that Kore-
matsu is an illegitimate foundation for the color-blind principle. He says Korematsu dealt
primarily with governmental restriction of civil rights. To use this standard in the area of
affirmative action, Tribe continues, where the government is allocating state-created opportu-
nities for advancement, confuses Black's meaning. Tribe, supra note 182, at 202. Tribe ignores
the fact that allowing the government to allocate a certain number of its limited, state-created
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tims of past discrimination, would even strike laws that passed strict
scrutiny. Because nearly all racial classifications would fail under a race
neutralism, there is no scrutiny more "rigid"-to use Black's word-
than race neutralism.
It is true that neither Korematsu nor Plessy will be celebrated as red-
letter days in the Court's history. Yet history's judgment does not de-
tract from two conclusions. First, it is possible and justifiable to rescue
from these "bad" cases the sound legal reasoning of Harlan and
Black.'93 Second, the holdings of these "bad" cases surely would have
been different under a race neutral rule, because such a rule prohibits all
racial classifications including those which disadvantage minorities. 9 4
It has been argued that neither strict scrutiny nor a race neutral ap-
proach should be applied to benign racial classifications. John Hart Ely
was among the first to make this contention.195 He suggested that strict
scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review when whites favored
blacks at the expense of other whites.' 9 6 "When the group that controls
the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and
disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, con-
sequently, employing [strict scrutiny] ... are lacking. ' 197
Although appealing on its face, Ely's argument is flawed. He as-
sumes that the "white majority" controls the decision-making process.
Yet, it is minority groups-not large, diffuse, and disorganized majori-
ties-who control the American legislatures on both the federal and
state level. 198 Minority groups, whether members of the particular group
are linked by race, gender, age, or a special political interest (e.g., trial
lawyers or gun owners), are politically powerful.199 Since they control
the decision making process, the minority groups act to advantage them-
opportunities for advancement to minority group members restricts the ability of others to
receive those state-created opportunities.
193. The Supreme Court has often used language from "bad" cases to justify "good" re-
sults. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down the state's miscegenation
laws under the strict scrutiny test and quoting with approval Hirabayshi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
194. Rosenfeld, supra note 115, at 1755.
195. See generally John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
U. CHi. L. RFv. 723 (1974).
196. Id. at 727.
197. Id. at 735.
198. Justice Scalia, himself, made this point. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that affirmative action proponents have ignored
the "predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized" workers).
199. Guido Calabresi, Foreword- Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability
(What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. Rv. 80, 96 (1991).
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selves. The National Rifle Association, for example, has been repeat-
edly successful in blocking stringent gun control legislation despite
apparent majority support.200 Likewise, social security benefits have be-
come a political "sacred cow" because of the power of the elderly. Mi-
nority groups have conquered the decision making process (that is, state
legislatures and Congress) through their concentrated lobbying, single-
issue voting, ability to build coalitions with other minorities, money, in-
ternal cohesiveness, and threats of violence or other disorder.210 Minori-
ties not only control legislative branches, but oftentimes determine who
sits in the Oval Office. In eleven American presidential elections, the
winner received only a plurality of the popular vote.202 Accordingly, Ely
misreads the political process and how groups actually control the deci-
sion making process.20 3
Another legal foundation for a color-blind rule is contained in the
great moral principle of the school desegregation cases, especially Brown
v. Board of Education.°4 In Brown, Chief Justice Warren never men-
tioned a race neutral approach nor did he apply strict scrutiny or any
other constitutional standard of review. Yet, the justification for the
Brown decision rests in "the wide acceptance and enormous persuasive-
ness of the principle that no person should be disadvantaged by govern-
ment because of his race. 205 The invidious school segregation of Brown
operates in the same way as, and cannot be distinguished in any sense
from, benign racial classifications.20 6
In sum, the legal foundation of race neutrality was most forcefully
expressed by Alexander Bickel. "The lesson of the great decisions of the
Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the
same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is ille-
gal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. 207
200. Id. at 96 n.48.
201. Id.; Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 27.
202. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125 (1956). Dahl men-
tioned nine elections. The elections of President Nixon in 1968 and President Clinton in 1992,
both by pluralities, occurred after the publication of this book.
203. Posner, supra note 201, at 21.
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
205. Graglia, supra note 187, at 596.
206. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 61 (1962).
207. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 133.
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B. The Practicality of a Color-Blind Rule
Because almost all racial classifications would be struck under a
color-blind rule, it is a simple rule to implement. The rule is not bur-
dened with any complex "theoretical apparatus" that must be used to
determine "the nature and scope of its proper application.120 Most im-
portant, a color-blind rule is, by its own terms, a neutral principle. It is
important for all courts, especially the Supreme Court, to use neutral
principles for the adjudication of cases.209 Neutral principles foreclose
"ad hoc constitutional judgments which express merely the judge's tran-
sient feeling of what is fair, convenient, or congenial in the particular
circumstances of a litigation. 2 1 0 A neutral principle also produces like
results in like cases. 11 In the area of affirmative action, it is readily ap-
parent that the Supreme Court has not yet grasped a neutral principle.
The Court still does battle over the proper standard of constitutional
review, and the different standards produce different constitutional re-
sults (that is, whether the statute is struck down or not).
The color-blind rule can be "authoritatively enforced without adjust-
ment or concession and without let-up. '212 In addition, the rule elimi-
nates a problem inherent in the judicial review of all affirmative action
programs, that is, "who decides what groups are sufficiently disadvan-
taged to deserve special treatment. '21 3 Of course, the result of a race
neutral rule when applied to affirmative action plans will offend some
groups. However, this only proves the rule's validity. 14
Besides being a neutral principle, a color-blind rule is practical on
another level-the rule increases judicial efficiency. Justice Kennedy
commented that the rule would serve an important structural goal, elimi-
nating the necessity for courts to examine, on a case-by-case basis, each
208. Rosenfeld, supra note 115, at 1755. Both the strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny
tests have difficult theoretical apparatus with which to deal. For example, what are "compel-
ling" governmental interests? How close must the means be to the ends in order to be "sub-
stantially related?"
209. Both sides of the debate over benign racial classifications realize this. For example,
Ely wrote that "the principle I propose is a neutral one: regardless of whether it is wise or
unwise, it is not 'suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate
against itself." Ely, supra note 195, at 727 (emphasis added).
210. BicKEL, supra note 206, at 59.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1312, 1321 (1986).
214. BICKEr, supra note 206, at 59.
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racial preference disseminated by federal or local governments.215
C. The Morality of a Color-Blind Rule
The principle that no one should be disadvantaged by the govern-
ment on the basis of race or national origin is the moral axiom upon
which the color-blind rule stands.216 The persuasive appeal and useful-
ness of this axiom and of a color-blind rule cannot be denied.217 How-
ever, opponents of the rule (and by implication, such opponents are
proponents of affirmative action) fiercely claim that today, the "color-
blind criteria have become more instrumental in defeating the remedia-
tion rather than the reality of discrimination against minorities."2 8 With
this criticism in mind, race neutralists must overcome charges of sinister
motivation219 through the collection of arguments which rest upon unim-
peachable moral and philosophical grounds.
From the Tower of Babel, which the discussion of a color-blind rule
and its close cousin affirmative action often resemble, it is possible to
draw out three separate and somewhat interrelated arguments22 which,
when marshalled together, best support this proposition: A color-blind
rule for almost all racial classifications is the morally and philosophically
correct approach; to disadvantage some races for the benefit of others is
disastrous for the individual and society.
The first argument is that preferential treatment for racial minorities
"exacerbates racial resentments, entrenches racial divisiveness, and
thereby undermines the consensus necessary for effective reform."221
As mentioned above, the universal principles of equality before the law
and neutral decision making are etched in the American psyche. When
laws, like Title VII and the Constitution, are interpreted to support
215. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 518-19 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. Rosenfeld, supra note 115, at 1755.
217. Graglia, supra note 187, at 584.
218. LIVELY, supra note 161, at 137.
219. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986). Kennedy claims that the motives of those who
disfavor affirmative action programs "reflect racially selective indifference, antipathy born of
prejudice, or strategies that seek to capitalize on widespread racial resentments." Id. at 1339.
Like much criticism of affirmative action opponents, Kennedy's comment drips of bitter,
self-righteous indignation summoned from depths that are, to me, unfathomable. Ely once
confessed to having "trouble understanding the place of righteous indignation on either side
of this wrenching moral issue." Ely, supra note 195, at 723.
220. These arguments are, by no stretch of the imagination, novel. Randall Kennedy
nicely summarized many anti-affirmative action arguments. See Kennedy, supra note 219, at
1327.
221. Id. at 1330.
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color-blindness for some citizens and color-consciousness for other citi-
zens, grotesque violence is done to those principles.222 And such an in-
terpretation "exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode of
thought and behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in mod-
em America." 2'
The source of this resentment reveals itself when the operation of
affirmative action programs is examined. Governments create only a
limited number of opportunities in the area of employment, education,
and the awarding of public funds. For example, the University of Cali-
fornia at Davis Medical School matriculated only one hundred new stu-
dents each year. When blacks are given opportunities simply on the
basis of their skin color, the government has denied those same opportu-
nities to others not born black.' 4 Those denied the opportunities on the
basis of their skin color must feel resentment not only toward the gov-
ernment but also toward the advantaged minorities. It is, without a
doubt, the kind of resentment felt by millions of blacks who, after eman-
cipation and the Civil War, were also denied opportunities on the basis
of race. It is the kind of resentment that fuels the many political cam-
paigns of David Duke in Louisiana and provides fodder for Jesse
Helms's television spots. Beyond these manifestations, the damage
caused to the compelling goal of racial harmony in America is not read-
ily apparent. It is only apparent that the powerful tools of government
are best used elsewhere; for in this area, by promulgating benign racial
classifications, the government only harms society.' z
The second argument in favor of a color-blind rule is that affirmative
action programs disregard the traditional American system of advance-
ment through individual merit and stigmatize those preferred minorities
because it is implied that they cannot compete on an equal basis with
Whites. 226 When judged on their individual merits, people receive a de-
222. Abram, supra note 213, at 1319.
223. Posner, supra note 201, at 12. Posner avoided making the argument that benign ra-
cial classifications stigmatize the person chosen.
224. JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTnusT A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170
(1980).
225. Morris Abram first joined the civil rights movement in the late 1940s. He suggests a
useful role the government could play. "The role of government in securing racial justice, I
came to believe, is best limited to vigilant concern with equal opportunity, procedural regular-
ity, and fair treatment of the individual." Abram, supra note 213, at 1314.
226. Kennedy, supra note 219, at 1330. Kennedy rejected this argument as did Justice
Brennan in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 374 (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, & Blackman, JJ.).
The traditional, American system of advancement through individual merit has not been
kind to blacks nor helped them in the past. All the talent in the world, for instance, did not
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sired benefit, opportunity, or reward because of what they have
achieved, and that achievement indicates individual excellence.227 On
the other hand, affirmative action plans judge those preferred minorities
only on the basis of their skin color. To return to the example of the
U.C. Davis Medical School, only one black applicant would have quali-
fied through the normal admission procedures between 1970 and 1974.
During those same years, twenty-six black applicants were admitted
under the school's affirmative action program.228 For society to condone
this and allow affirmative action to flourish, with governmental sponsor-
ship, makes America little more than a society of quotas.2 2 9 Further,
racial quotas demean "the human dignity and individuality" of everyone
they favor.230
The importance of assessing individuals on their own merit, not their
skin color, cannot be overemphasized. No one can rest easy when they
cross a highway viaduct in Richmond, Virginia and realize the subcon-
tractor who designed the concrete supports was awarded this important
job not on merit (i.e., because the subcontractor was experienced or an
excellent engineer), but on the basis of skin color. No affirmative action
program can erase the stigma felt by a black medical student at U.C.
Davis who, despite hard work and outstanding achievement in his under-
graduate college, feels the questioning glances of his white colleagues-
colleagues who believe his presence is only attributable to the medical
school's affirmative action program.
Some in the modern civil rights movement will respond, "Why
shouldn't there be more black doctors? More minority construction
workers? Blacks have not traditionally been proportionally represented
(thanks to discrimination) in these and other areas of employment."
This demand for the equality of results231 is a far cry from the original
civil rights movement's promotion of equal opportunity and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s dream of a nation in which his four children would
"not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their
help Thurgood Marshall, who was forced to attend the segregated, all-black Howard Univer-
sity Law School.
227. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to His Ability, from None According to
His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV. 815, 815 n.1
(1980).
228. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 n.6 (Powell, J.).
229. BORK, supra note 26, at 106.
230. BICKEL, supra note 180, at 133.
231. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 42 (1984); see also
Abram, supra note 212, at 1313.
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character." 2 As sad as this shift of focus is, even sadder is the inability
of the modem civil rights movement to see any difference between the
two goals. But as Thomas Sowell explained, "there are many reasons,
besides genes and discrimination, why groups differ in their economic
performances and rewards. Groups differ by large amounts demograph-
ically, culturally, and geographically-and all of these differences have
profound effects on incomes and occupations." 3  All the social engi-
neering in the world cannot change these results and will merely stigma-
tize the intended beneficiaries.
Third and finally, benign racial classifications frequently help those
blacks who need it least and who can least plausibly claim to have been
disadvantaged by past discrimination.3 4 Such racial classifications also
hurt blameless whites and thus, cause some of the problems discussed
earlier, including racial resentment.
It is difficult for modem Americans to conceive of the physical and
psychological horror and degradation inherent in the institution of slav-
ery. Furthermore, the great economic, political, and social burdens that
have been placed on blacks, often with the explicit, or at least implicit,
imprimatur of the state, from the time of this nation's founding and to
lesser and lesser degree until today must never be lightly disregarded.
However, it is one thing to acknowledge the hardships suffered by
blacks in the past; it is quite a different proposition to judicially allow the
state to advantage the minorities of today who have suffered a good deal
less than their ancestors?3' Moreover, it must be remembered, the
nonminority group members excluded from such "benign" preferences
may not have inflicted, nor ever have received, any tangible benefits
from the prior discrimination. 36 Some proponents of affirmative action
programs reject the presumption of racial innocence for any individ-
ual.2 7 However, convincing many white people today that they are
guilty of racism, even if they never practiced it, would be a nearly impos-
sible mission. In reality then, affirmative action plans undo no past
harms. Instead they inflict new harms on individuals, American society,
232. CORETrA S. KING, My LIFE WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 239 (1969) (quoting
the March on Washington speech of August 28, 1963).
233. SOwELL, supra note 231, at 42.
234. Kennedy, supra note 219, at 1333.
235. Posner, supra note 201, at 16.
236. Id.; see also BORK, supra note 26, at 106.
237. LIVELY, supra note 161, at 158; see also Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 468 (arguing in a different
context--college speech codes-that "[r]acism is ubiquitous. We are all racists.").
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and the cause of justice. 38
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been misguided on the question of affirma-
tive action. In Bakke, Justice Blackmun intriguingly posited, "In order
to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race."239 This is an
interesting but false proposition. To truly get beyond racism in America,
Americans must stop thinking in racial terms and more importantly, pre-
vent our government from acting on the basis of race in the distribution
of opportunities.
As Bakke demonstrates, the Supreme Court was wrong from the be-
ginning in the area of affirmative action. It has been nearly a century
since Justice Harlan's initial declaration of a color-blind Constitution.
As time went by Justices Douglas and Stewart also declared allegiance to
race neutralism, but it was not until Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Croson that a color-blind rule for benign racial classifications was fully
articulated. Unfortunately, Scalia, like Harlan, Douglas, and Stewart
before him, is far from commanding a majority of the Court and, given
the current political climate, probably never will.24
From the time of the Civil War to the triumph of the civil rights
movement in the 1960s, state sponsored racial segregation was fought
with the belief that the government should not classify people by the
color of their skin, regardless of the equality with which they were
treated.241 Now that the civil rights movement and liberal establishment
have shifted their focus, it seems that a color-blind rule has become a
rallying point for conservative jurists. While it is true that the debate
over this issue generally splits along ideological lines (with a few notable
exceptions like Alexander Bickel), the split is truly unfortunate 242 since
238. BORK, supra note 26, at 106.
239. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
240. Currently, there are only three Justices who could be considered supporters of a race
neutral approach to benign racial classifications: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy,
and Justice Scalia. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(joined by Rehnquist, J.); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (praising Scalia's color-blind approach); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Justice Ginsburg may not support a race neutral approach.
241. KULL, supra note 191, at 1.
242. At least one commentator does not feel the same remorse. "Those who believe that
a principle permitting [affirmative action] ... can be made acceptable to many of those it
would disadvantage must have had experiences and have perceptions so different from mine
as to make communication between us on this subject difficult." Graglia, supra note 187, at
586.
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both liberals and conservatives have claimed the race neutral principle
and its moral imperative as their own, albeit at different times in history.
Take note of this ringing denunciation of state sponsored racial classifi-
cations. "Classifications and distinctions based on race or color have no
moral or legal validity in our society. They are contrary to our constitu-
tion and laws ...."243
The author of those words was Thurgood Marshall.
JAMES L. McALISTER
243. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
(1948) (No. 369) (per curiam).
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